Estel v. Diego
G.R. No. 174082; January 16, 2012
Facts. Petitioner contends that since
respondents failed to allege the location of the disputed parcel of land in
their complaint, the MTCC did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the said complaint. Petitioner also avers that the MTCC did not acquire
jurisdiction over the case for failure of respondents to specifically allege
facts constitutive of forcible entry. On the bases of these two grounds,
petitioner argues that the MTCC should have dismissed the complaint (for
Forcible Entry, Damages and Injunction with Application for Temporary
Restraining Order) motu proprio. However, a review of the records shows that
petitioner did not raise the issue of jurisdiction or venue in her Answer filed
with the MTCC.
Held. CA
correctly held that even if the geographical location of the subject property
was not alleged in the Complaint, petitioner failed to seasonably object to the
same in her Affirmative Defense, and even actively participated in the
proceedings before the MTCC. In fact, petitioner did not even raise this issue
in her appeal filed with the RTC. Thus, she is already estopped from raising
the said issue in the CA or before this Court. Estoppel sets in when a party
participates in all stages of a case before challenging the jurisdiction of the
lower court (Bernardo v.
Heirs of Eusebio Villegas, G.R. No. 183357, March 15, 2010, 615 SCRA 466,
475). One cannot belatedly reject or repudiate the lower court's
decision after voluntarily submitting to its jurisdiction, just to secure
affirmative relief against one's opponent or after failing to obtain such
relief (id). The
Court has, time and again, frowned upon the undesirable practice of a party
submitting a case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if
favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction when adverse
(id).
As to respondents' supposed failure to allege
facts constitutive of forcible entry, it is settled that in actions for
forcible entry, two allegations are mandatory for the municipal
court to acquire jurisdiction (Lee
v. Dela Paz, G.R. No. 183606, October 27, 2009, 604 SCRA 522, 535). First, the plaintiff
must allege his prior physical possession of the property (id). Second, he must
also allege that he was deprived of his possession by any of the means provided
for in Section 1, Rule 70 of the Revised Rules of Court, namely, force,
intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth (id).
In the present case, it is clear that
respondents sufficiently alleged in their Complaint the material facts
constituting forcible entry as they explicitly claimed that they had prior
physical possession of the subject property since its purchase from petitioner,
who voluntarily delivered the same to them. They also particularly described in
their complaint how petitioner, together with her two sons and five other
persons, encroached upon the subject property and dispossessed them of the
same. Respondents' complaint contains the allegations that petitioner, abetting
and conspiring with other persons, without respondents' knowledge and consent
and through the use of force and intimidation, entered a portion of their land
and, thereafter, uprooted and destroyed the fence surrounding the subject lot,
as well as cut the trees and nipa palms planted thereon. Unlawfully entering
the subject property and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would
necessarily imply the use of force and this is all that is necessary (Spouses Manuel and Florentina del Rosario v.
Gerry Roxas Foundation, Inc., G.R. No. 170575, June 8, 2011). In order to constitute force, the trespasser does not have to institute
a state of war (Antazo v. Doblada, G.R. No. 178908, February 4, 2010, 611 SCRA 586, 594). No other proof is necessary (id). In the
instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged
that the possession of the subject property was wrested from them through
violence and force.msfffacebook
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