Election Law Doctrines

A.      Election Law

1.      Suffrage

The right of suffrage is not at all absolute. The exercise of the right is subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements embodied in our Constitution, statute books, and other repositories of law. As to the substantive aspect, Section 1 of Article V of the Constitution provides for it. As to the procedural limitation, the right of a citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon certain procedural requirements he must undergo: among others, the process of registration. Proceeding from the significance of registration as a necessary requisite to the right to vote, the State undoubtedly, in the exercise of its inherent police power, may then enact laws to safeguard and regulate the act of voters’ registration for the ultimate purpose of conducting honest, orderly, and peaceful election (Akbayan-Youth v. COMELEC; GR Nos. 147066 & 147179; 26 March 2001)

In this case, even if we assume for the sake of argument, that the appellate docket fees were not filed on time, this incident alone should not thwart the proper determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. In Bince, Jr. v. Comelec, 312 Phil. 316 (1995), it was ruled that blind adherence to a technicality, with the inevitable result of frustrating and nullifying the constitutionally guaranteed right of suffrage, cannot be countenanced. (Asistipo v. Hon. Aguirre, et al., G.R. No. 191124; April 27, 2010).

Since the Constitution also provides that suffrage may be exercised by all citizens, Section 2(4) of Article IX-B does not prohibit civil service officers and employees from voting. Thus, civil service officers and employees cannot engage in any electioneering or partisan political activity except to vote. This is clear from the second paragraph of Section 3(3), Article XVI of the 1987 Constitution, which provides: “No member of the military shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity, except to vote.” The Civil Service laws implement this constitutional ban by stating that civil service officers and employees cannot engage in any partisan political activity except to vote. Section 55, Chapter 7, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides: “Section 55.- Political Activity. - No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to votenor shall he use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other person or body. xxx.” (Qunito v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698; December 1, 2009)

The conduct of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts. Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement and administration of all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the indisputable expertise in the field of election and related laws. (Cayetano v. COMELEC et al., G.R. Nos. 166388 and 166652; January 23, 2006).

2.                  Qualification and Disqualification of Voters

The periods of residence in the Philippines and in the place of registration delve into the matter of residency, a requisite which a voter must satisfy to be deemed a qualified voter and registered in the permanent list of voters in a precinct of the city or municipality wherein he resides. Of even rationality exists in the case of the requirement in Section 10 (j), mandating that the applicant should state that he/she is not a registered voter of any precinct. Multiple voting by so-called flying voters are glaring anomalies which this country strives to defeat. The requirement that such facts as required by Section 10 (g) and Section 10 (j) be stated in the voter’s application form for registration is directly relevant to the right of suffrage, which the State has the right to regulate. (Spouses Romualdez v. COMELEC; G.R. No. 167011, April 30, 2008)

The fact that a candidate has a dual citizen prior his filing his certificate of candidacy does not disqualify him from running public office (Cordora v. COMELEC, 580 SCRA 12 [2009]).

3.                  Registration of Voters

A person who has not duly accomplished an application for registration is not a registered voter. xxx The application for registration shall contain three specimen signatures of the applicant. (Gunsi, Sr. v. COMELEC, 590 SCRA 70)

The clear text of the law thus decrees that voters be allowed to register daily during regular offices hours, except during the period starting 120 days before a regular election and 90 days before a special election (Kabataan Party-List Representative Palatino, et al. v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189868; December 15, 2009)

4.                  Inclusion and Exclusion Proceedings

The petition for exclusion is a necessary component to registration since it is a safety mechanism that gives a measure of protection against flying voters, non-qualified registrants, and the like. The prohibitive period, on the other hand serves the purpose of securing the voter’s substantive right to be included in the list of voters.  (Akbayan, et al v. COMELEC, G.R. No.147066, March 26, 2001)

It is not within the province of the RTC in a voter’s inclusion/exclusion proceedings to take cognizance of and determine the presence of a false representation of a material fact. It has no jurisdiction to try the issues of whether the misrepresentation relates to material fact and whether there was an intention to deceive the electorate in terms of one’s qualifications for public office. The finding that Velasco was not qualified to vote due to lack of residency requirement does not translate into a finding of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render him ineligible (Panlaqui v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 188671; February 24, 2010).

Inclusion/exclusion proceedings essentially involve the simple issue of whether a petitioner shall be included in or excluded from the list of voters based on the qualifications required by law and the facts presented to show possession of these qualifications (Velasco v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 180051;   December 24, 2008).

In terms of purpose, voters’ inclusion/exclusion and COC denial/cancellation are different proceedings; one refers to the application to be registered as a voter to be eligible to vote, while the other refers to the application to be a candidate.  Because of their differing purposes, they also involve different issues and entail different reliefs although the facts on which they rest may have commonalities where they may be said to converge or interface.  One such commonality is on the matter of residence.  Section 9 of Republic Act 8189, otherwise known as the Voters’ Registration Act (VRA), requires that voters “shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place wherein they propose to vote, at least six (6) months immediately preceding the election.”  The OEC, on the other hand, requires under its Section 74 that the would-be candidate state material facts such as, among others, his residence.  Under the combined application of  Section 65 of the OEC and Section 39 of the Local Government Code (LGC), a local official must – among others – have the same residency requirement as required under the VRA.  Another point of convergence is on the candidate’s status as a registered voter; a candidate for a local government position must be a registered voter in the barangay, municipality, province, or city where he or she intends to run for office (Velasco v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 180051;   December 24, 2008).

The remedies available in the two proceedings likewise differ. Velasco’s remedy from the adverse decision in his petition for inclusion as voter is as provided under Section 138 of the OEC quoted above.  From the MTC, the recourse is to the RTC whose decision is final and executory, correctible by the Court of Appeals only by a writ of certiorari based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.   On the other hand, the approval of a certificate of candidacy or its denial is a matter directly cognizable by the COMELEC, with the decision of its Division reviewable by the COMELEC en banc whose decision is in turn reviewable by this Court under Rule 64 of the Rules of Court and Section 7, of Article IX-A of the 1987 Constitution(Velasco v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 180051;   December 24, 2008).

Compliance with the period set for objections on exclusion and inclusion of election returns is mandatory. Otherwise, to allow objections after the canvassing would be to open the floodgates to schemes designed to delay the proclamation and frustrate the electorate’s will by some candidates who feel that the only way to fight for a lost cause is to delay the proclamation of the winner. It should be noted that proceedings before the Board of Canvassers is summary in nature which is why the law grants the parties a short period to submit objections and the Board a short period to rule on matters brought to them (Sano, Jr. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 182221; February 3, 2010)

5.                  Political Parties

Petitioners Abayon and Palparan have a common theory: Republic Act (R.A.) 7941, the Party-List System Act, vests in the COMELEC the authority to determine which parties or organizations have the qualifications to seek party-list seats in the House of Representatives during the elections. Indeed, the HRET dismissed the petitions for quo warranto filed with it insofar as they sought the disqualifications of Aangat Tayo and Bantay. Since petitioners Abayon and Palparan were not elected into office but were chosen by their respective organizations under their internal rules, the HRET has no jurisdiction to inquire into and adjudicate their qualifications as nominees. (Abayon v. HRET, G.R. No. 189466; February 11, 2010 & Palparan Jr. v. HERT, G.R. No. 189506; February 11, 2010)

Although political parties play an important role in our democratic set-up as an intermediary between the state and its citizens, it is still a private organization, not a state instrument. The discipline of members by a political party does not involve the right to life, liberty or property within the meaning of the due process clause. An individual has no vested right, as against the state, to be accepted or to prevent his removal by a political party. The only rights, if any, that party members may have, in relation to other party members, correspond to those that may have been freely agreed upon among themselves through their charter, which is a contract among the party members. Members whose rights under their charter may have been violated have recourse to courts of law for the enforcement of those rights, but not as a due process issue against the government or any of its agencies. But even when recourse to courts of law may be made, courts will ordinarily not interfere in membership and disciplinary matters within a political party. A political party is free to conduct its internal affairs, pursuant to its constitutionally-protected right to free association. (Atienza, Jr., et al. v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 188920; February 16, 2010)

The present petition has openly stated its objective of forestalling the accreditation of the respondent NP-NPC; the petition expressly and frontally sought the issuance of a writ of prohibition and restraining order to prevent the COMELEC from accrediting a coalition that is not registered as a party. The combination of a petition for certiorari and for prohibition under the circumstances of the present case is fully justified, as the registration and the accreditation that the petition covers are linked with and in fact sequentially follow one another. Accreditation can only be granted to a registered political party, organization or coalition; stated otherwise, a registration must first take place before a request for accreditation can be made. Once registration has been carried out, accreditation is the next natural step to follow. (Liberal Party v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 191771;  May 6, 2010)

6.                  Candidacy

a.      Qualifications of Candidates

Qualifications prescribed by law are continuing requirements and must be possessed for the duration of the officer's active tenure.  Once any of the required qualifications are lost, his title to the office may be seasonably challenged.  (See Frivaldo v. COMELEC, 174 SCRA 245; Labo v. COMELEC, 176 SCRA 1)

The Court recapitulates in Papandayan, Jr., 381 SCRA 133 (2002), that it is the fact of residence that is the decisive factor in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the residency qualification requirements (Japson v. COMELEC, 576 SCRA 331)

The Constitution does not require congressional candidate to be a property owner in the district where he seeks to run but only that he resides in that district for at least a year prior to election day-to use property in the district as the determinative indicium of permanence of domicile or residence implies that only the Court would be, in effect, imposing a property requirement to the right to hold public office, which property requirement would be unconstitutional (Fernandez v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, 608 SCRA 733 [2009]).

"Disqualification" proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds specified in §12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the purpose of barring an individual from becoming a candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate from the race either from the start or during its progress. "Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the incumbent from office. (Fermin v. COMELEC, GR Nos. G.R. No. 179695 & G.R. No. 182369; December 18, 2008)

When the evidence of the alleged lack of residence qualification of a candidate for an elective position is weak or inconclusive and it clearly appears that the purpose of the law would not be thwarted by upholding the victor’s right to the office, the will of the electorate should be respected. For the purpose of election laws is to give effect to, rather than frustrate, the will of the voters. To successfully challenge disqualification, petitioner must clearly demonstrate that respondent’s ineligibility is so patently antagonistic to constitutional and legal principles that overriding such ineligibility and thereby giving effect to the apparent will of the people would ultimately create greater prejudice to the very democratic institutions and juristic traditions that our Constitution and laws so zealously protect and promote. (Japzon v. Ty, GR No. G.R. No. 180088;  January 19, 2009)

Congress exercises the power to prescribe the qualifications for SK membership. One who is no longer qualified because of an amendment in the law cannot complain of being deprived of a proprietary right to SK membership. Only those who qualify as SK members can contest, based on a statutory right, any act disqualifying them from SK membership or from voting in the SK elections. SK membership is not a property right protected by the Constitution because it is a mere statutory right conferred by law. Congress may amend at any time the law to change or even withdraw the statutory right. (COMELEC v. Cruz, et al., G.R. No. 186616; November 20, 2009)

In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961), the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC (Luna v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 165983; April 24, 2007)

b.      Filing of Certificates of Candidacy

When a campaign period starts and the person who has filed his/her certificate of candidacy proceeds with his/her intent into actuality, the Court can already consider his/her acts, after the filing of his/her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) and prior to the campaign period, as the promotion of his/her campaign period, as the promotion of his/her election as a candidate, hence constituting premature campaign for which he/she may be disqualified. Conversely, if said person, for any reason withdraws his/her COC before the Campaign period, then there is no point to view his/her acts prior to said period acts for he promotion of his/her election as a candidate (Penera v. COMELEC 599 SCRA 609 [2009]).

(1)               Effect of Filing

            It was emphasized that the purpose of the law is to defer to the sovereign will of the people by letting elective officials serve until the end of the terms for which they were elected notwithstanding the filing of their certificates of candidacy. On the contrary, the automatic resignation rule was imposed upon appointive officials because unlike elected politicians, “appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from engaging in any partisan political activity or from taking part in any election, except to vote”. (Quinto et al., v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 189698; February 22, 2010)

(2)               Substitution of Candidates

The COMELEC acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in declaring that Hans Roger, being under age, could not be considered to have filed a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, could not be validly substituted by Luna. The COMELEC may not, by itself, without the proper proceedings, deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy filed in due form. In Sanchez v. Del Rosario, 111 Phil. 733 (1961), the Court ruled that the question of eligibility or ineligibility of a candidate for non-age is beyond the usual and proper cognizance of the COMELEC. xxx In this case, there was no petition to deny due course to or cancel the certificate of candidacy of Hans Roger. The COMELEC only declared that Hans Roger did not file a valid certificate of candidacy and, thus, was not a valid candidate in the petition to deny due course to or cancel Luna’s certificate of candidacy. In effect, the COMELEC, without the proper proceedings, cancelled Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy and declared the substitution by Luna invalid. xxx Therefore, unless Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was denied due course or cancelled in accordance with Section 78 of the Election Code, Hans Roger’s certificate of candidacy was valid and he may be validly substituted by Luna (Luna v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 165983; April 24, 2007).

(3)               Nuisance Candidates

In controversies pertaining to nuisance candidates as in the case at bar, the law contemplates the likelihood of confusion which the similarity of surnames of two (2) candidates may generate. A nuisance candidate is thus defined as one who, based on the attendant circumstances, has no bona fide intention to run for the office for which the certificate of candidacy has been filed, his sole purpose being the reduction of the votes of a strong candidate, upon the expectation that ballots with only the surname of such candidate will be considered stray and not counted for either of them (Martinez III v. HERT, et al., G.R. No. 189034; January 11, 2010).

"The rationale behind the prohibition against nuisance candidates and the disqualification of candidates who have not evinced a bona fide intention to run for office is easy to divine. The State has a compelling interest to ensure that its electoral exercises are rational, objective, and orderly. Towards this end, the State takes into account the practical considerations in conducting elections. Inevitably, the greater the number of candidates, the greater the opportunities for logistical confusion, not to mention the increased allocation of time and resources in preparation for the election. These practical difficulties should, of course, never exempt the State from the conduct of a mandated electoral exercise. At the same time, remedial actions should be available to alleviate these logistical hardships, whenever necessary and proper. Ultimately, a disorderly election is not merely a textbook example of inefficiency, but a rot that erodes faith in our democratic institutions(Martinez III v. HERT, et al., G.R. No. 189034; January 11, 2010).

(4)               Petition to Deny or Cancel Certificates of Candidacy

            COC defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that COC mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken. A mandatory and material election law requirement involves more than the will of the people in any given locality. Where a material COC misrepresentation under oath is made, thereby violating both our election and criminal laws, we are faced as well with an assault on the will of the people of the Philippines as expressed in our laws. In a choice between provisions on material qualifications of elected officials, on the one hand, and the will of the electorate in any given locality, on the other, we believe and so hold that we cannot choose the electorate will. (Mitra v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 191938; July 2, 2010)

            If the disqualification or Certificate of Candidacy cancellation/denial case in not resolved before election day, the proceeding shall continue even after the election and the proclamation of the winner (Velasco v. COMELEC 575 SCRA 590 [2008])

After having considered the importance of a certificate of candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs. Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been cancelled and denied due course (Ong v. Alegre, G.R. No. 163295; January 23, 2006).

Certificate of Candidacy defects beyond matters of form and that involve material misrepresentations cannot avail of the benefit of our ruling that Certificate of Candidacy mandatory requirements before elections are considered merely directory after the people shall have spoken (Velasco v. COMELEC 575 SCRA 590 [2008])

(5)               Effect of Disqualification

            The filing of a motion for reconsideration of a decision of a COMELEC Division disqualifying a winning candidate effectively suspends the execution of such resolution, thereby allowing for the proclamation of such candidate (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 178831-32; April 1, 2009)

            The case for disqualification exists, and survives, the election and proclamation of the winning candidate because an outright dismissal will unduly reward the challenged candidate and may even encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of the disqualification case until after he has been proclaimed. (Lonzanida v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 135150; July 28, 1999). The exception to the rule of retention of jurisdiction after proclamation applies when the challenged candidate becomes a member of the House of Representatives or of the Senate, where the appropriate electoral tribunal would have jurisdiction. There is no law or jurisprudence which says that intervention or substitution may only be done prior to the proclamation of the winning candidate. A substitution is not barred by prescription because the action was filed on time by the person who died and who is being substituted. The same rationale applies to a petition-in-intervention (Lanot, et al v. COMELEC, et al. G.R. No. 164858 November 16, 2006)

(6)               Withdrawal of Candidates

            The Election Code allows a person who has filed a certificate of candidacy to withdraw the same prior to the election by submitting a written declaration under oath. There is no provision of law which prevents a candidate from withdrawing his certificate of candidacy before the election (Luna v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 165983; April 24, 2007).

            The withdrawal of a certificate of candidacy does not necessarily rendered the certificate void ab initio----once filed, the permanent legal effects produced thereby remain even if the certificate itself be subsequently withdrawn (Limbona v. COMELEC, 555 SCRA 391).

7.                  Campaign

a.      Premature Campaigning

            A candidate is liable for an election offense only for acts done during the campaign period, not before. The law is clear as daylight — any election offense that may be committed by a candidate under any election law cannot be committed before the start of the campaign period. In ruling that petitioner is liable for premature campaigning for partisan political acts before the start of the campaigning, the assailed Decision ignores the clear and express provision of the law that xxxx "any unlawful act or omission applicable to a candidate shall take effect only upon the start of the campaign period." The plain meaning of this provision is that the effective date when partisan political acts become unlawful as to a candidate is when the campaign period starts. Before the start of the campaign period, the same partisan political acts are lawful. (Penera v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181613; November 25, 2009)

Only after the persons who has filed his/her COC officially becomes a candidate, at the start of the campaign period, can his/her disqualification be sought for acts constituting premature campaigning (Penera v. COMELEC 599 SCRA 609 [2009]).

While it is true that a private person, not just a candidate, can commit the crime of premature campaigning, but before the private person can commit the crime, there must first be another person who is already considered by law a “candidate,” Section 79(b) of the Omnibus Election Code provides that the “term of election campaign or partisan political activity refers to an act designed to promote the election or defeat of a particular candidate or candidate to public office”----thus, there can be no premature “election campaign” or partisan “political activity” unless there is a “candidate” (Penera v. COMELEC 599 SCRA 609 [2009]).

b.      Prohibited Contributions

The law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the same, the term "every candidate" must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. xxx It is not improbable that a candidate who withdrew his candidacy has accepted contributions and incurred expenditures, even in the short span of his campaign. The evil sought to be prevented by the law is not all too remote. It is notesworthy that Resolution No. 2348 even contemplates the situation where a candidate may not have received any contribution or made any expenditure. Such a candidate is not excused from filing a statement, and is in fact required to file a statement to that effect. Under Section 15 of Resolution No. 2348, it is provided that "[i]f a candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact." (Pilar v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 115245 July 11, 1995).

8.                  Board of Canvassers

The statutory power of supervision and control by the COMELEC over the boards of canvassers includes the power to review or reverse the action of the boards as well as to do what the board should have done- such power includes the authority to initiate motu propio such steps or actions as may be required pursuant to law, like reviewing the action of the board, conducting inquiry affecting the genuineness of election return beyond the election records of the polling places involved, annulling canvass or proclamations based on incomplete returns or an incorrect or tampered returns, invalidating a canvass or proclamation made in unauthorized meeting of the board of canvassers either because it lacked quorum or because the board did not meet at all, or requiring the board to convene (Flauta v. COMELEC, 593 SCRA 504 [2009]).

9.                  Remedies and Jurisdiction in Election Law

a.                  Petition Not to Give Due Course to Certificate of Candidacy

The denial of due course or cancellation of one’s certificate of candidacy is not within the administrative powers of the Commission, but rather calls for the exercise of its quasi-judicial functions (Sison v. CA, G.R. No. 124086, June 26, 2006). Hence, the Court may only compel COMELEC to exercise such discretion and resolve the matter but it may not control the manner of exercising such discretion. However, as previously discussed, the issuance of a writ commanding COMELEC to resolve the petition for disqualification will no longer serve any purpose since COMELEC has issued its decision on the matter (Quizon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 177927; February 15, 2008).

b.                  Petition to Declare Failure of Elections

Before the COMELEC can act on a verified petition seeking to declare a failure of elections, two conditions must concur: (1) no voting took place in the precinct or precincts on the date fixed by law, or even if there was voting, the election resulted in a failure to elect; and (2) the votes not cast would have affected the result of the elections. The cause of such failure of election could only be any of the following: force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes (Dibaratun v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 170365; February 2, 2010)

Questions of vote buying, terrorism and similar acs should be resolved in a full-blown hearing before a regular court (Albaña v. Belo 602 SCRA 140 [2005].

c.                   Pre-Proclamation Controversy

A pre-proclamation controversy is any question pertaining to or affecting the proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate or by any registered political parties before the board or directly with COMELEC, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of the Omnibus Election Code in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of election returns (Lucman v. COMELEC, 462 SCRA 299 [2005]).

A pre-proclamation controversy is limited to an examination of the election returns on their face, and as a rule, the COMELEC is limited to an examination of the returns on their face. The proceedings in a pre-proclamation controversy are summary in nature (Lucman v. COMELEC, 462 SCRA 299 [2005]).

            A pre-proclamation controversy, according to Section 1, Article XX of the Omnibus Election Code, refers to : x x x any questions pertaining to or affecting proceedings of the board of canvassers which may be raised by any candidate of by any registered political party or coalition of parties before the board or directly with the Commission, or any matter raised under Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 in relation to the preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of the election returns (Suhuri v. COMELEC, 602 SCRA 633 [2009]).

            Section 243 of the Omnibus Election Code limits a pre-proclamation controversy to the questions enumerated therein. In a pre-proclamation controversy, the Commission of Elections is restricted to an examination of the election returns and is without jurisdiction to go beyond or behind the election returns and to investigate election irregularities (Suhuri v. COMELEC, 602 SCRA 633 [2009]).

            The mere filing of a petition denominated as a pre-proclamation case or one seeking the annulment of a proclamation will not suspend the ten-day period for filing an election protest (Abayon v. COMELEC, 583 SCRA 472 [2009]).

            The determination by the COMELEC of the merits of a pre-proclamation case definitely involves the exercise of adjudicatory powers; where powers rests in judgment or discretion, so that the exercise thereof is of judicial nature or character, but does not involve the exercise of functions of a judge, or is conferred upon an officer other than a judicial officer, it is deemed quasi-judicial (Valino v. Vergara, 581 SCRA 44 [2009]).

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath and assumed office as a Member of the House of Representatives , the COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal’s (HERT’s) own jurisdiction begins----the proclamation of the winning candidate divest the COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending before it at the time of the proclamation (Señeres v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179708; April 16, 2009).

The grounds that must support a pre-proclamation controversy are limited by the Omnibus Election Code to the following: Section 243. Issues that may be raised in pre-proclamation controversy.- The following shall be proper issues that may be raised in a pre-proclamation controversy: (a) Illegal composition or proceedings of the board of canvassers; (b) The canvassed election return are incomplete, contain material defects, appear to be tampered with or falsified, or contain discrepancies in the same returns or in other authentic copies thereof as mention in Sections 233, 234, 235 and 236 of this Code; (c) The election returns were prepared under duress, threats, coercion, or intimidation, or they are obviously manufactured or not authentic, and (d) When substitute or fraudulent returns is controverted polling places were canvassed, the results of which materially affected the standing of the aggrieved candidate or candidates. (Abayon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181295;  April 2, 2009)

            The purpose of a pre-proclamation controversy is to ascertain the winner or winners in the election on the basis of the election returns duly authenticated by the board of inspectors and admitted by the board of canvassers; The Board of the Canvassers and the Commission on Elections are not to look beyond or behind electoral returns (Abayon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181295;  April 2, 2009)

d.                  Election Protest

The jurisdiction over election contests involving elective municipal officials has been vested in the RTC by Section 251, Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (Omnibus Election Code). On the other hand, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, by specifying the proper venue where such cases may be filed and heard, only spelled out the manner by which an RTC with jurisdiction exercises such jurisdiction. Like other rules on venue, A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC was designed to ensure a just and orderly administration of justice, and is permissive, because it was enacted to ensure the exclusive and speedy disposition of election protests and petitions for quo warranto involving elective municipal officials. (Gomez-Castillo v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 187231; June 22, 2010)

      An election controversy, which by its very nature touches upon the ascertainment of the people’s choice as gleaned from the medium of the ballot, should be resolved with utmost dispatch, precedence and regard to due process (Panlilio v. COMELEC, 593 SCRA 139 [2009]).

            When there is an allegation in an election protest that would require the perusal, examination or counting of ballots as evidence, it is the ministerial duty of the trial court to order the opening of the ballot boxes and the examination and counting of ballots deposited therein. (Tolentino v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 187958 & Nos. 187961-62; April 7, 2010)

      In Dayo v. COMELEC (199 SCRA 449 [1991]), the Court declared that allegations of fraud and irregularities are sufficient grounds for opening the ballot boxes and examining the questioned ballots (Panlilio v. COMELEC, 593 SCRA 139 [2009]).

            While there is merit in allowing an election protest to proceed in order to ascertain the allegations of massive fraud and irregularities which tend to defeat the electorate’s will, one must also keep sight of jurisdictional requirements such as the period within which to file the protest. Otherwise, election disputes would drag on, and the political stability which the election rules seek to preserve will be vulnerable to challenges even beyond a reasonable period of time. In this case, petitioner failed to give this Court a justification for the delay in filing his election protest, apart from his reliance on the argument that the manifestly invalid pre-proclamation case he filed suspended the period for the filing of his election protest.(Abayon v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 181295;  April 2, 2009)

The rule prescribing the ten-day period for the filing of election protest is mandatory and jurisdictional, and the filing of an election protest beyond the period deprives the court of jurisdiction over the protest (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 178831-32; April 1, 2009)

The power of the COMELEC are essentially executive and administrative in nature, and this is the reason why the question of whether or not there were terrorism, vote buying and other irregularities in the election should be ventilated in regular election protests (Hipe v. COMELEC, 602 SCRA 565 [2009]).

Suffrage is a matter of public, not private interest---in election protest, any benefit to a party would simply be incidental (Dueñas, Jr. v. HRET, 593 SCRA 316 [2009])

Once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as Member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contest relating to his election, returns, and qualifications ends, and the HERT’s own jurisdiction begins (Aggabao v. COMELEC, 449 SCRA 400 [2005]).

While the right to a public office is personal and exclusive to the public officer, an election protest is not purely personal and exclusive to the protestant or to the protestee such that the death of either would oust the court of all authority to continue the protest proceedings; Court have allowed substitution and intervention but only by a real party in interest; Protestant’s widow is not a real party interes to this election protest (Poe v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 454 SCRA 142 [2005]).

As a general rule, the proper remedy after the proclamation of the winning candidate for the position contested would be to file a regular election protest or quo warranto (Espidol v. COMELEC, 472 SCRA 380 [2005]).

The protestant, in assuming the office of Senator and discharging her duties as such, has effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest, or abandoned her determination to protect and pursue the public interest involved in the matter of who is the real choice of the electorate (Legarda v. De Castro, 542 SCRA 125 [2010]).

Petitioner is reminded that a petition for disqualification based on material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy is different from an election protest. The purpose of an election protest is to ascertain whether the candidate proclaimed elected by the board of canvassers is really the lawful choice of the electorate (Justimbaste v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. No. 179413; November 28, 2008).

A party in an election protest has no clear right to have the election documents subject of protest reproduced and authenticated prior to the transmittal to the COMELEC main office, and if there were such a right, imposing upon the COMELEC the correlative duty to respect the right, the proper remedy is petition for mandamus not certiorari (Tolentino v. COMELEC, 565 SCRA 363 [2008]).

e.      Quo Warranto

After the proclamation of the winning candidate in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may assail one’s eligibility/qualification/disqualification is to file before the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal (HERT) a petition of an election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the period provided by the HERT Rules (Limkaichong v. COMELEC, et al., G.R. Nos. 178831-32; April 1, 2009)

A petition for quo warranto is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HERT, and cannot be considered a forum shopping even if the COMELEC had already passed upon in administrative or quasi-judicial proceedings the issue of the qualification of the Member of the Hose of Representatives while the latter was still a candidate (Fernandez v. House of Representative Electoral Tribunal, 608 SCRA 733 [2009])

10.              Prosecution of Election Offenses

Election contest involves public interest, and technicalities and procedural barriers must yield if they constitute an obstacle to the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials-the Court frowns upon any interpretation of the law that would hinder in any way not only the free and intelligent casting of votes in an election but also the correct ascertainment of the results (Flauta, Jr. v. COMELEC, 593 SCRA 504 [2009])

The COMELEC sitting en banc does not have the authority to hear and decide election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies in the first instance as the COMELEC in division has such authority; COMELEC en banc can exercise jurisdiction only on motions for reconsideration of resolution or decision of the COMELEC in division (Pacifidor v. COMELEC, 571 SCRA 372 [2009]).

            A motion to reconsider a resolution of the COMELEC en banc in cases involving election offenses is prohibited (Flauta, Jr. v. COMELEC, 593 SCRA 504 [2009].

            Since the contested proceedings at the Senate Electoral Tribunal (“Contested proceedings”) are no longer part of the adversarial aspects of the election contests, they did not require notice of hearing and the participation of the parties----what took place at the SET ere the internal deliberations of the COMELEC, as quasi-judicial body, in the course of appreciating the evidence presented and deciding the provincial election contest on the merits (Mendoza v. COMELEC, 603 SCRA 692 [2005]).

            The rule at the present is that trial courts of limited jurisdiction have exclusive original jurisdiction over election protest involving barangay officials, which include the SK Chairman, and that the COMELEC has the exclusive appellate jurisdiction over such protests (Fernandez v. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765 [2008]).

            Condonation of administrative offense applies only to an elective public official who was re-elected during the pendency of an administrative case against him (Office of the Ombudsman v. Torres, 566 SCRA 65 [2008]).